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It is hardly news that amounts budgeted for America’s defense have steadily declined over 
the past four years in both dollar outlays and share of the federal budget. And it is hardly less 
newsworthy that words in the form of communiques, white papers, policy statements, 
summaries, news conferences, treaties, and position papers, have dramatically increased. 
Defense expenditures fell from $291 billion in FY 1993 to $265 billion in FY 1996, an 
annual decrease of approximately 3 percent. In the same period, military personnel decreased by 
about 132,000. On the other hand, the State Department’s budget increased by $100 million over 
the same time period although it had 1,900 fewer employees. And while there are no statistics 
available with respect to the increase in word output from the State Department, based on the 
number of daily news releases describing one diplomatic activity or another, it seems fair to 
conclude that the 3 percent decrease in defense spending is at least matched by a 3 percent 
increase in U.S. diplomatic word output. It would seem we have been substituting words for 
weapons. The question is whether this is a good tradeoff. Evidently Congress had some concerns. 
In 1996 it provided $7 billion more in defense spending than requested by President Clinton. 
The conventional justification for a decrease in defense spending is that the Cold War 
between the West and Soviet Union is over, hence the threat to America’s national security is 
correspondingly diminished. While the part about the Cold War being over is obviously correct, 
it is the second part of the rationale that is troubling. Argued here is that the world is a far more 
dangerous place than it was 15 years ago. In this respect: 
*An approximate military balance between the West and the Soviet Union existed. And while 
a major conflict could escalate and spread into a global nuclear war at a cost in lives and treasure 
beyond calculation, such a possibility was understood by both sides and acted as a restraint or 
military adventurism. 
*Non- Soviet Union threats to the United States were essentially terrorists acts. While costly 
in lives and property, these attacks were still random with no government willing to acknowledge 
sponsorship. Moreover, American intelligence agencies were generally successful in thwarting 
such attacks or bringing the perpetrators to justice. 
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*While there were a number of countries in 1982 with the potential to openly challenge 
United States military power on a regional basis, these by and large were potential, not existing 
threats. 
In 1997 it is another matter. The goal of smaller, essentially hostile countries such as Iran, Iraq, 
North Korea, Libya, and Syria is to develop and deploy nuclear and/or chemical-biological 
weapons. Our goal is to stop them. Both they and we have had some successes. Their success is 
that their programs are still on-going. Our success is that in some instances, through bribery or 
sanctions (words) we have slowed their development. We bribed North Korea to forgo 
developing nuclear weapons but our payoff is far from certain. 
Fifteen years ago the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) was recognized as a potential military 
superpower. In 1997 “actual” is quite close to replacing “potential.” China has the world’s 
largest active duty military force (2,900,000) with 1.2 million in reserve. It has nuclear 
warheads and ballistic missiles. Its armor and military aircraft are among the world’s largest, 
and it is investing heavily in its naval forces with the goal of power projection. No combination 
of East Asian nations come even close to matching the PRC’s overall military capability. More 
important is that China has used and will use the threat of its military power to forward 
geopolitical objectives. The American response to keeping the dragon at bay has been 
words-trade preferences, most favored nation trade status, summits, and policy statements 
critical of China’s denial of basic human rights. 
Many respected analysts, however, deny superpower status to the PRC. After citing 
America’s technological superiority in weaponry, they argue that China’s military capability is 
not global encompassing, that is, it could not simultaneously fight and win two major regional 
conflicts far from its borders. (U.S. defense planning rests on being able to fight and win two 
major regional conflicts simultaneously) The fallacy in this reasoning is that any future U.S. -
PRC conflict will not be contested half a world away but rather in Asia and Asian waters. In this 
scenario, considering China anything less than a superpower is not only irresponsible but 
reckless in the extreme. 
And then there is Russia. Admittedly not the Soviet Union of old, but a country nonetheless 
that still has a latent capability of returning to military superpower status. But before citing 
Russia’s present difficulties as a reason for complacency-its many economic problems, political 
instability, a growing population unrest, and the West pushing to expand NATO eastward--note 
should be taken that a wounded Russian bear is far less predictable than a healthy one. 
If it is granted that the world is, indeed, a dangerous place in 1997, is there any historical 
wisdom to draw on. Actually, there is. President Theodore Roosevelt is credited with urging a 
policy of “speak softly but carry a big stick.” Freely translated it means less words and more 
military capability. The opposite would be to speak often (many words) and carry a small stick. 
Equally important--it is not entirely a question of more or less military capability but of a 
willingness to use it. Precisely applied in time and place, a small capability goes a long way. Few 
would disagree that Hitler could have been defanged in the mid 1930s by a judicious application 
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of limited force by Great Britain and France. Instead, words were substituted for action and 
words failed. Does all this mean that applying military power is always preferable to diplomacy? 
Hardly. What it does mean is that words alone can never be an effective substitute for military 
capability and a willingness to use it. 
*Clinton H. Whitehurst, Jr. is a professor emeritus of Management and Economics and a senior
  fellow in the Strom Thurmond Institute. 
4 
